From David Weston:
In response to John Allen's Blog of 24 May, I recall the situation he described.
Both 3 RAR and 4 RAR had deployed to the east of the Long Binh-Bien Hoa complex - a major US base area covering a large area with the Bien Hoa airbase, and the Long Binh and Plantation army logistic bases. This deployment was to deny the VC/ NVA forces close access to these key areas. After about 2 weeks in the area, we were warned to deploy south back towards Nui Dat.
At the time I was a Gun Line Section Commander with 161 Battery (Left Section)and we (161 Bty) deployed in Direct Support of 3 RAR to the area of the border between Bien Hoa and Phouc Tuy provinces, just to the east of Route 15 between Vung Tau, Baria and Saigon. 4 RAR (ANZAC) were deployed south of the 3 RAR area and I recall hearing over the Regimental net one afternoon that V Coy had been involved in a contact within a bunkered camp.
That night we fired a series of H&I tasks (Harassing and Interdiction) in preparation for a Battalion attack planned by 4 RAR (ANZAC) the next morning. The next morning, I think, we were placed "at priority call" to the BC 104 Battery RAA to support this attack, and then fired a fire plan as the attack was mounted. I don't remember hearing at the time what the outcome of the attack was, but I do remember quite a spirit of "oneness" with V Coy while the Battery was firing to support them.
Over the next few days, as a result of some slack staff work at Arty Tac/ RCP, 161 Bty ammunition holdings fell to about 10-15 rounds per gun (normal 1st line holdings were something close to 100 rpg!) and we then received a priority re-supply from 2 Skycrane helicopters each carrying 12 A22 containers with a total of 480 rounds per aircraft. This brought us back up to a reasonable holding of ammunition.
